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A B S T R A C T
Interventions to reduce risk often have an associated cost. In UK industries decisions about risk reduction are
made and justiﬁed within a shared regulatory framework that requires that risk be reduced as low as reasonably
practicable. In health care no such regulatory framework exists, and the practice of making decisions about risk
reduction is varied and lacks transparency. Can health care organisations learn from relevant industry
experiences about making and justifying risk reduction decisions? This paper presents lessons from a qualitative
study undertaken with 21 participants from ﬁve industries about how such decisions are made and justiﬁed in
UK industry. Recommendations were developed based on a consensus development exercise undertaken with
20 health care stakeholders. The paper argues that there is a need in health care to develop a regulatory
framework and an agreed process for managing explicitly the trade-oﬀ between risk reduction and cost. The
framework should include guidance about a health care speciﬁc notion of acceptable levels of risk, guidance
about standardised risk reduction interventions, it should include regulatory incentives for health care
organisations to reduce risk, and it should encourage the adoption of an approach for documenting explicitly
an organisation's risk position.
1. Introduction
For the past 15 years improving patient safety has been a national
priority in many countries [1,2], while well publicised scandals such as
the failings at Mid Staﬀordshire NHS Foundation Trust [3] and
previously at Bristol Royal Inﬁrmary [4] have contributed to increasing
the public concern about the safety and quality of health care provision.
Many of the frequently suggested patient safety improvements and risk
reduction interventions carry an associated cost, such as increasing the
number of nursing staﬀ or the introduction of electronic prescribing
systems [5]. National health care systems, such as the National Health
Service (NHS) in England, are operating in an extremely diﬃcult
ﬁnancial climate [6]. Therefore, health care organisations need to make
decisions about whether or not to invest eﬀort and resource in
understanding and reducing risks to patient safety, i.e. organisations
need to manage – implicitly or explicitly – the trade-oﬀ between risk
reduction and the associated costs.
At present, health care regulators and health care organisations lack
clear guiding principles for how such trade-oﬀs should be managed,
and how decisions about patient safety improvements and risk reduc-
tion interventions should be taken and justiﬁed [7]. Decisions about
whether to invest in risk reduction are often taken implicitly, and
practice is, therefore, variable and dependent on individuals or local
patient safety improvement teams [8]. Box 1 provides a brief real-world
vignette from the Safer Clinical Systems programme [8].
In UK safety-critical industries, such as the petrochemical and
nuclear industries, decision-makers are faced with similar problems of
having to manage the trade-oﬀ between risk reduction and associated
cost [9]. However, in these industries decision-making about risk
reduction is embedded in a strong regulatory framework [10]. Trade-
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MARK
oﬀs between reducing risk and the associated costs are made explicitly
within the context of the concept of “reasonable practicability” [11].
This concept is used to demonstrate that risks have been controlled
eﬀectively to a point where the cost of further risk reduction would be
grossly disproportionate to the expected beneﬁts (As low as reasonable
practicable – ALARP) [12]. Aﬀordability of risk reduction interventions
is not a consideration in the ALARP justiﬁcation. The trade-oﬀs and
justiﬁcations are documented in a safety case, which can be reviewed
and challenged by the regulator [7].
In practice, making such decisions can be diﬃcult, and practical
problems with the ALARP concept have been highlighted [13–15].
More generally, the concept of risk has been framed and discussed
from diﬀerent perspectives in the literature, and there is no single or
agreed deﬁnition of risk [16]. Detailed theoretical discussions of the
risk concept are provided, for example, in [16–19]. While risk has often
been regarded as something calculable or as an objective reality, there
are other views that emphasise the dynamic and social dimension of
risk [20–22]. In health care the unique perspective of the patient
should also be considered, and it has been suggested that in this
context risk might best be understood as something personal that
needs to be discussed and negotiated between the patient and health
care professionals [23]. Therefore, the question of whether a system or
a health care service is safe enough, should not be decided based on
the, usually, probabilistic analysis of risk alone, but rather through a
process that takes into account both the scientiﬁc evidence as well as
other value judgements [15,24].
Health care organisations and national health systems have been
encouraged to learn lessons from other industries in order to improve
their safety management systems and safety performance [25], for
example through the introduction of incident reporting systems [26],
the use of proactive hazard identiﬁcation methods [27], or the adoption
of aviation-style checklists to manage safety-critical tasks [28].
Learning from industry is a reasonable suggestion [29], but the
successful transfer of lessons from industry to health care often proves
to be challenging in practice [7,30]. For example, there is a wealth of
literature discussing the perceived failures of incident reporting
systems in health care [31–34] and the practical problems associated
with the implementation of checklists [35,36]. Owing to the diﬀerent
organisational, institutional and cultural context in health care lessons
from industry need to be transferred with caution, and tools and
methods have to be adapted appropriately [8]. Failure to understand
properly the underpinnings, beneﬁts and limitations of tools and
methods within their original industrial context might limit their utility
in health care [37] or even contribute to increasing risk to patients
[30].
In order to facilitate learning and the transfer of lessons from
industry about how decisions about risk reduction and the associated
costs are made and justiﬁed, it is important, therefore, to study how
such trade-oﬀs are made in practice in diﬀerent industries, and to
reﬂect on how corresponding tools, methods and frameworks might be
adapted within a health care context. The paper describes stakeholder
views on the practice of managing the trade-oﬀ between risk reduction
and cost in ﬁve UK industries. The analysis of these industry
perspectives provided the starting point for a consensus development
process with health care stakeholders about potential lessons for health
care. Based on this consensus development process the paper argues
that there is a need in health care to develop a regulatory framework
and an agreed process for managing explicitly the trade-oﬀ between
risk reduction and cost. Such a framework should include guidance
about a health care speciﬁc notion of acceptable levels of risk and
standardised risk reduction interventions. It should also provide
regulatory incentives for health care organisations to reduce risk. In
order to complement and integrate with existing business cases, this
framework should encourage the adoption of an approach for doc-
umenting explicitly an organisation's risk position, for example
through the use of safety cases.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the research
design, and the methods for data collection and data analysis. Section 3
presents key themes from the analysis of interviews with industry
stakeholders. Section 4 outlines the lessons from the health care
stakeholder consensus development. Section 5 discusses the ﬁndings
of the study with a view to the existing literature. Implications for
policy and practice are provided in the concluding Section 6.
2. Methods
The study included two main components: a qualitative analysis of
UK industry stakeholder perceptions on how decisions about risk
reduction and the associated costs are made in practice, and a
consensus development process with health care stakeholders to
identify lessons for health care.
2.1. Setting
The ﬁve safety-critical UK industries included in the study were:
aviation, defence, nuclear, petrochemical and transportation (rail and
road). These industries were selected because (a) the research team had
pre-existing links to stakeholders as well as personal experience of
Box 1.Cost-Safety Trade-Oﬀs in a Renal Surgery Safety Improvement Example.
Ninety-nine risks were identiﬁed for shared care of
patients undergoing surgery on a renal unit.
A hospital aimed to improve the safety of shared care arrangements between the
renal medicine team and the surgical team for patients with Established Renal
Failure. The local improvement team used Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality
Analysis (FMECA) to understand the vulnerabilities of their current process. The
team identified 99 hazards and associated risks. These included, for example,
absence of medical review by a senior doctor pre-operatively, no documented
surgical plan pre-operatively, and documented surgical review not provided
post-operatively. The improvement team decided to work on the six highest-
ranking risks.
Questions remain about which risks should be ad-
dressed and how much money should be spent.
This decision was taken based on practicality: the resources and time available,
and the control the local team had over the proposed improvements. However,
the team did not have guidance available for important questions such as:
What level of risk is acceptable and how would the team determine such a level?
Is there an ethical duty to reduce all identiﬁed risks or is it appropriate to focus
only on a sub-set?
How much money should be spent on risk reduction and how would this be
determined?
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working in these industries, and (b) safety assessments and corre-
sponding trade-oﬀs between risk reduction and cost are particularly
relevant in safety-critical industries.
The consensus development process was not limited to any speciﬁc
health care setting, but aimed to include views from a diverse range of
health care stakeholders.
2.2. Semi-structured interviews
Industry stakeholder perceptions were elicited through semi-struc-
tured interviews. Interviews were conducted with a purposive sample
of 21 participants during July – October 2014. Participants were
sampled based on the industry they work in to ensure roughly equal
spread across industries, and based on their involvement with safety or
ﬁnance. Table 1 provides an overview of interview participants by
industry and job role.
Participants received a participant information leaﬂet, and provided
written consent prior to their involvement. Participation was voluntary,
and participants were free to withdraw at any time. Interviews lasted
between 30 and 50 min, and were carried out by diﬀerent members of
the research team who are experts in the respective industry.
Interviews were audio recorded if the participant provided consent to
this. Audio recordings were then transcribed verbatim. Any identiﬁers
were removed to preserve anonymity.
The interviews explored the topics from the interview template
shown in Table 2. The interview template was developed by reviewing
the literature, and by discussing key ﬁndings from the review within the
research team. The interview template, therefore, represents the main
themes identiﬁed from the literature. The literature review focused on
published regulatory guidance on making and justifying decisions
about risk reduction, oﬃcial reports, as well as literature evaluating
the eﬀectiveness of recommended approaches, such as quantitative
Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis.
Using the main themes identiﬁed from the literature as represented
in the interview template as the overarching organising structure,
interview transcripts were analysed inductively and iteratively using
Thematic Analysis [38]. Transcripts were read and coded using Open
Coding [39]. An analytic memo was kept as each transcript was coded
to keep track of thoughts and ideas, and to reﬂect on the coding
process. Themes within each interview topic were identiﬁed through
clustering of similar or related codes in project meetings. While the
initial thematic structure was provided by the literature review, the
analysis remained open to the possibility of new themes being
identiﬁed by constantly comparing themes with the data. The coding
was supported by the NVivo 10 software package.
This approach to qualitative analysis introduces the possibility of
analyst bias and might reduce the validity of the ﬁndings. The main
strategy adopted to ensure adequate quality and validity of the
qualitative analysis process was to subject the emerging ﬁndings of
the analysis to constant review and scrutiny by the wider research
team. No additional respondent validation was undertaken at this
stage, as the “reality check” for these ﬁndings was scheduled for the
subsequent stakeholder consensus development process.
2.3. Consensus development process
The ﬁndings of the interview study with industry participants
provided the starting point for a consensus development process with
health care stakeholders. The rationale for this was that a group of
health care stakeholders with a diverse range of backgrounds might be
well placed to appraise the industry ﬁndings, and to generate lessons
and priorities that might be acceptable to their peers.
A three-step consensus development process based on the Nominal
Group Technique [40] was undertaken with a purposive sample of 20
healthcare stakeholders to establish lessons that are applicable to the
health service (with a UK focus). Table 1 provides an overview of the
participants by job role. Participants were sampled to include a breadth
of clinical, managerial, policy-making and regulatory roles. All parti-
cipants have a stake in the management of risk and patient safety,
either as a service provider or from the regulatory side. Six of the 20
participants have patient safety as the main focus of their job role. No
details were recorded about the formal risk and safety management
qualiﬁcations of the participants. All participants received a participant
information leaﬂet, and participation was voluntary. No personal or
otherwise identiﬁable data was collected from participants.
In the ﬁrst round of the consensus development process, partici-
pants were invited individually to describe in writing scenarios where
trade-oﬀs between risk reduction and the associated costs might have
to be taken and justiﬁed. The second round consisted of a workshop
held at the Health Foundation oﬃce. Prior to the workshop, partici-
pants were sent a summary of the ﬁndings from the analysis of industry
stakeholder perceptions. The summary included a description of the
ALARP concept. It is reasonable to assume that the majority of
participants will have been unfamiliar with the ALARP concept. The
Table 1
Study participants.
Industry interviews Health care consensus development process
Sector Role Role
Aviation EU Regulations Impact Assessor Chief Executive
Head of Air Transport System Operations Planning Unit (Air Traﬃc Management) Clinical Director for Patient Safety
Project Manager Safety (Regulator) Quality and Safety Manager
Change and Safety Manager (Airport) Medical Director
Defence Safety Engineer Chief Nurse
Safety Manager Head of Patient Safety Policy and Strategy
Safety Policy Manager Technical Claims Manager
Aircraft Design Standards Manager Senior Policy Advisor
Safety Case Reviewer (Air Traﬃc Equipment) Director of Nursing
Nuclear Design Authority Manager (Nuclear service provider) Clinical Improvement Network Director
Lead Assessor (Regulator) Senior Consultant
Systems Engineer (Nuclear service provider) Medical Director
Independent Nuclear Safety Consultant Consultant in Anaesthesia and Intensive Care Medicine
Process Mechanical Engineer Process Safety (Consultant) Director of Programmes Consultant in Acute Medicine
Safety Superintendent (Oil reﬁnery) Deputy Director of Risk, Governance and Patient Safety
Process Safety Manager (Chemicals manufacturing facility) Consultant Paediatrician
Chemical Engineer (Regulator) Director of Clinical Effectiveness
Rail and Road Signalling Design Manager (Railway infrastructure provider) Lead Nurse in Acute Care
Head of Evaluations (Railway) Executive Clinical Director
Head of Road Economics
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purpose of providing participants with a description of ALARP was to
sensitise them for the presentation of the ﬁndings that would take place
during the workshop. The description of ALARP provided was not
intended to thoroughly educate participants. On the day, the workshop
consisted of: (a) presentations by the research team about key ﬁndings
to date including an overview and discussion of ALARP to ensure all
participants had a basic understanding of the concept and the rationale
for adopting it in UK industries, (b) group work, where participants
discussed aspects of managing the trade-oﬀ between risk reduction and
cost using a sub-set of the scenarios identiﬁed in the ﬁrst round,
structured by a discussion template, and (c) a facilitated plenary
discussion, where participants attempted to draw out key lessons and
open issues from the day. The list of scenarios used during the
workshop is shown in Table 3, and the discussion template is shown
in Table 4. The completed scenario templates from the workshop, and
the notes from the plenary session were used to develop an online
survey for the ﬁnal, third round of the consensus development process.
The survey was split into two parts: the ﬁrst part served as validation of
key ﬁndings from the workshop, and the second part was for establish-
ing consensus around lessons and priorities for health care.
Participants ﬁlled in the survey individually. For the purpose of this
study, consensus was deﬁned as agreement by at least two thirds of
participants. Some questions were worded in such a way that disagree-
ment by at least two thirds of study participants was regarded as
consensus. The survey statements are shown in Table 5.
Table 2
Topics explored during the industry interviews.
Topic Prompts
Role Could you please describe your current role within your organisation and how many years of
experience you have in this role?
Scenarios and examples of trade-oﬀs between risk reduction
and cost
Could you please describe through examples the type and range of situations where trade-offs
between risk reduction and cost are made?
What are typical types of projects (large scale/small scale)?
Is there a focus on engineering projects or does it include general organisational changes (e.g. risks
of shift handover)?
What types of decisions are supported through this trade-off?
Motivations for making the trade-oﬀ between risk reduction
and cost explicit
What is the influence of regulatory requirements?
What role have previous major accidents in the industry played?
What is the role of safety benefits (risk reduction) within the company's business case?
Making ALARP judgements in practice Is there a formal process for managing the trade-off? What does it look like?
What kinds of methods are used?
Are explicit values placed on human life?
What other factors are considered, e.g. ethical issues, business impacts, technical feasibility,
regulatory considerations)?
How are decisions recorded?
How much effort is involved in making such decisions in practice?
Communicating decisions How are decisions about risk reduction and cost communicated?
Who gets to see the analysis and decisions?
What kinds of communication processes exist with the regulator?
How explicit is the communication (e.g. safety case)?
What gets challenged in practice?
Practical challenges What are the obstacles and challenges in practice when managing these trade-offs?
How are these challenges dealt with in practice?
What are possible suggestions for improving the practice of managing the trade-oﬀ?
Table 3
Stakeholder proposed scenarios used during the consensus development workshop.
Scenario Description
Moving services into the community To reduce the burden on hospitals, and to provide more patient-centred care, the introduction of a new community intravenous antibiotic
service is considered.
However, this novel type of service might entail new forms of patient safety risk, such as elderly patients being unable to cope at home,
and less opportunity for healthcare professionals to monitor patients at home.
Purchase of an IT system Prescribing errors are a recognised threat to patient safety. The literature provides evidence that with the introduction of electronic
prescribing, error rates may be reduced significantly.
However, the literature also suggests that the introduction of electronic support systems, such as electronic prescribing, can lead to
unanticipated consequences and novel patient safety risks.
National patient safety alert notice National bodies, such as formerly the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA), issue guidance on how to deal with recognised patient safety
risks. An example might be the health IT requirements specification established by the NPSA to minimise the possibility of prescribing
overdoses of oral methotrexate.
The speciﬁcation introduced the following safety features:
• Picking list with drug form and strength pre-populated
• Alerts at point of drug selection to remind the practitioner that this is a high risk process
• Alerts to warn of the danger of dual therapy
• Links to clinical audit and monitoring.
Consider this case from the point of view of the national body (how do they arrive at this set of recommendations for reducing risk? ), as
well as from the point of view of the healthcare organisation implementing this process (how do they make decisions about whether or not
the risks in their context have been adequately controlled).
Changing staﬃng levels Certain patient safety risks might be reduced through increased staffing levels. For example, extra pharmacy staff to cover weekends
might contribute to reducing delays and stress-related human error.
On the other hand, sometimes it may be desirable to reduce the number of staﬀ for economic reasons. However, this might contribute to
increased levels of risk.
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3. Perceptions about risk reduction and cost in ﬁve UK
industries
The ﬁndings of the qualitative analysis are reported based on the
themes identiﬁed from the literature, focusing on motivations for
making the trade-oﬀ between risk reduction and cost explicit, the use
of ALARP in practice, the role of quantitative Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis
(CBA), the communication of decisions about risk reduction, and
practical problems that participants have experienced. Furthermore,
the role of quantitative CBA was identiﬁed as an important additional
theme during the analysis.
3.1. Motivations for making the trade-oﬀ between risk reduction and
cost explicit
Each industry is regulated by standards that are expressions of the
ALARP principle in some form. Therefore, being able to justify to the
regulatory authority that risks have been reduced ALARP is an over-
arching motivation.
There are also ethical and societal concerns that act as motivations
for making well reasoned and appropriately documented decisions
about risk reduction. There can be genuine concern for employees and
the public, who should be protected from risk. In addition to such
ethical drivers, there can also be the recognition that risks to reputation
Table 4
Scenario template with prompts for discussion.
Topic Prompts
Scenario overview A description of a healthcare scenario will be provided, but participants might wish to add to/clarify the scenario.
Current practice Participants reflect on how decisions about risk reduction and cost are made in the scenario including:
• Types of risk reduction/cost decisions that are made
• Criteria that are used
• How costs and beneﬁts are compared
• Who gets to make the decisions
• What is the role of the regulator
Future practice Participants reflect on possible improvements to current practice using the prompts above and lessons from industry (e.g. is ALARP a suitable
criterion, should the regulator set a framework etc.).
Expected beneﬁts Participants discuss the benefits they expect from potentially more systematic approaches to making decisions about risk reduction and cost,
including:
• What are the beneﬁts?
• Who will see these beneﬁts?
Enablers and facilitators Participants reflect on the proposed approach by considering the current organisational and regulatory environment:
• Will the application of a more formal approach to making decisions about risk reduction and cost rely on other existing regulations/ systems/
developments?
• Are there factors that may facilitate the application of this formal approach to the selected scenario?
Constraints and barriers Participants reflect on the proposed approach by considering the current organisational and regulatory environment:
• What potential obstacles or constraints are there?
• How could these be overcome?
Ethical considerations Participants reflect on the ethical underpinnings of making decisions about risk reduction and cost, e.g.:
• Should all risks be reduced as far as possible as a moral duty?
• Is there a case for the application of the principle of “reasonable practicability”?
• Should aﬀordability override the moral duty to reduce risks?
Any other issue Please list and describe here any other issue relevant to the discussion.
Table 5
Consensus statements and results.
A. Validation of workshop discussion Participants in agreement (%)
1. New services are implemented (or new models of services) and changes to existing services are undertaken if this feels like “the right
thing” to do, when it is politically supported and desirable, and when it is perceived to be ﬁnancially beneﬁcial.
92
2. Systems-based and organisational safety risks are not considered formally in the design or at the outset of the change. 67
3. The concept of safety risk and the measurement of risk are poorly developed. 75
4. Safety risk management practices are reactive focusing on harm, not risk. 83
5. There is a lack of understanding of and transparency about how cost-beneﬁt decisions in safety assessments are made. 100
6. There is a lack of published literature on how to make decisions about risk reduction and cost in healthcare. 83
7. The regulators are not involved in the planning of new services or changes to existing services. 67
8. The regulators do not have a notion of acceptable levels of risk. 58
9. The regulators do not incentivise risk reduction. 83
B. Lessons and priorities for the health service
1. The regulator should become actively involved in the design of novel services and signiﬁcant changes to existing services. 25
2. The regulator should incentivise organisations to reduce risk. 92
3. The regulator should mandate an explicit account of organisational patient safety risks in the form of a safety case. 58
4. The regulator should provide best practice guidance on standardised risk reductions interventions. 67
5. Organisations should develop an explicit account of patient safety risks in the form of a safety case (even if not mandated) in order to
complement the ﬁnance focus of their business cases.
83
6. The NHS should adopt as a regulatory requirement the As Low as Reasonable Practicable (ALARP) principle, which the Health & Safety
Executive requires from operators of safety-critical systems.
50
7. The NHS should adopt the ALARP principle as guidance, but should not set it as a regulatory requirement. 50
8. The NHS should develop and adopt a healthcare speciﬁc notion of acceptable levels of risk (rather than adopt ALARP). 83
9. The NHS should not adopt a common notion of acceptable levels of risk because the NHS is not in a position to price-in risk reduction
interventions.
0
10. The NHS should adopt a structured process for making cost-beneﬁt decisions in safety assessments (this can be qualitative). 83
11. The complexity of healthcare makes the adoption of a quantitative cost-Beneﬁt Analysis (CBA) impractical. 8
12. A cost book, which provides guidance ﬁgures for costs associated with risks, should be developed to facilitate a quantitative CBA. 58
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and the resulting business risks might be more signiﬁcant than purely
the safety risks. Organisations might wish to be seen to be acting
ethically and not as making unsound decisions about safety. In some
cases, this might compel organisations to make greater ﬁnancial
investments in safety than would be required from a regulatory
perspective alone.
The importance of corporate risk and reputation is highlighted by
the quotation below. The participant suggests that there has been a
change in attitude, and that companies are now more aware of the
potentially negative impact of poor safety performance on the reputa-
tion and business of a company.
“Yes, over the last ten years that [corporate responsibility] has
become really much more signiﬁcant. It was not really there at all
some time ago, you know, ten, ﬁfteen years ago. But now that's
seen as one of the primary drivers that the business wants its
reputation to be high, and it wants to show that it's ethical and not
making any unsound decisions regarding safety and over ethical
issues as well.” (Safety Engineer/Defence)
3.2. Making ALARP judgements in practice
Trade-oﬀs between risk reduction and costs are made in the context
of ALARP judgements. Determining whether risks are ALARP can be
required in diﬀerent kinds of situations, ranging from assessing new
designs for a nuclear power plant to everyday operational risk manage-
ment, such as determining whether to install additional safety valves in
a petrochemical plant.
Participants suggested that a systematic risk analysis usually forms
the basis for ALARP demonstrations. Trade-oﬀs between risk reduction
and cost can be identiﬁed and described qualitatively ﬁrst, by estimat-
ing the number of fatalities, and by assigning coarse estimates to the
cost of possible risk reduction (order of magnitude). The risk analysis
and the qualitative approach to estimating the potential beneﬁts of risk
reduction and the associated cost can be informed to a large extent by
engineering judgement and gut feeling. This level of qualitative analysis
typically is considered suﬃcient in cases where the analysis indicates
that no signiﬁcant costs will be involved. If, on the other hand, the
analysis points to signiﬁcant impacts (either in terms of costs or risk) or
high levels of uncertainty in the analysis, then a more detailed impact
assessment might be undertaken. A quantitative CBA might also be
involved at this stage, but the level of this analysis would usually be
proportionate to the risk and the costs involved.
The ALARP judgements are based on a broad range of factors that
can go beyond the simple cost of the proposed risk reduction inter-
vention and the potential beneﬁts in terms of prevented fatalities.
Participants provided examples that include business or production
beneﬁts other than improved safety, and ethical considerations. In the
military context there might be considerations of operational capability
in situations where equipment such as aircraft would have to be taken
out of service for implementing risk-reducing modiﬁcations.
Ethical as well as business considerations might lead to higher
investments in risk reduction than required by regulatory guidance.
Corporate responsibility is a consideration, and whether one could
stand up in a court of law and argue that one truly believed (“hand on
heart”) that risk reduction was adequate. In the quotation below a
participant from the petrochemical industry describes that in situations
where the operational site management (i.e. the petrochemical proces-
sing facility) feels that investment in particular risk reduction inter-
ventions was the best thing to do, even if not required from an ALARP
perspective, they might look for other ways of justifying the expendi-
ture to the budget holders.
“With some issues, even if we don’t have to do them from a cost-
beneﬁt reason, we would still say, well actually it's still the best
thing to do. Is there any other way we can justify doing it? So it's
almost if it's something the site wants to do, it doesn’t necessarily
just stop at its not cost eﬀective if it's what the site believes should
be done. We will try and progress that through the business.”
(Process Safety Manager/Petrochemical)
3.3. The role of quantitative CBA in practice
The extent to which quantitative CBA is used varies across the
industries. However, participants suggested that reference to good
practice often means that there might not be a need for detailed
quantitative analysis. Quantitative CBA builds on the qualitative
analysis, and is used predominantly in situations that are characterised
by high risk (close to the unacceptable region in ALARP), where the
expenditure required is perceived as signiﬁcant, and where the ﬁndings
from the qualitative analysis were inconclusive. The risk reduction
interventions that might be analysed using CBA tend to be engineering
solutions rather than organisational changes, since costs for the former
are thought to be more readily available.
Reasons for adopting a quantitative analysis of safety beneﬁts and
associated costs include further data requirements following the
qualitative analysis, ensuring that safety-cost trade-oﬀ decisions stand
up in court, and providing more convincing arguments for safety
investments to management. A participant from the petrochemical
industry explained that CBA might be used as a tool to convince Board
members to spend money, rather than as a justiﬁcation for gross
disproportionality. Quantitative results from a CBA might be perceived
as a better communication tool with high-level management than the
simple observation that a site might be made safer as a result.
A key consideration in the application of CBA is the determination
of how to monetise human life and suﬀering. Across the industries an
estimated value of preventing a statistical fatality (VPF) based on
ﬁgures provided by the Department of Transport, and suggested by the
Health & Safety Executive, is adopted (around £1m). However, this
ﬁgure is frequently taken only as a basis, and modiﬁcations might be
applied. Organisations might also chose to increase the suggested
amount to err on the side of caution, for ethical reasons or to protect
business and reputational interest.
Results from the quantitative CBA are usually not the only
determinants for making decisions about risk reduction and cost
trade-oﬀs. In the quotation below, the participant uses the example
of risk transfer to suggest that there are factors that are not normally
considered in CBA, but that would feed into the ﬁnal decision.
“Well, there's certainly the risk transfer issue. So, you could
provide further risk reduction that reduces the safety risk, but
maybe transfers the risk to the environment, or it reduces the risk
to one group of people and increases it to another group of people,
and I’ve never seen that addressed in a quantitative way, but sort
of qualitative arguments are quite often presented for that sort of
thing.” (Chemical Engineer/Petrochemical)
3.4. Communication of risk reduction decisions
Trade-oﬀs between risk reduction and cost are normally documen-
ted formally as part of the justiﬁcation that risks have been reduced
ALARP. The ALARP justiﬁcation forms a key part of the safety case or
safety report, which is required by the regulator.
The regulator might challenge or question the justiﬁcations pro-
vided in the safety case. These queries tend to relate to the qualitative
risk assessment rather than the quantitative CBA. A reason for this is
that CBA might be perceived as a “number crunching” exercise, which
is determined by the assumptions made during the qualitative risk
assessment.
Organisations might not wish to publicise their management of
safety-cost trade-oﬀs for fear of being perceived as acting unethically,
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unless they have to. In the quotation below, a participant suggests that,
similarly, individuals might not wish to disclose the speciﬁcs of their
analysis, which in turn reduces transparency and prevents learning.
“People are always quite reticent to publicise what they’ve got, not
possibly because it's intellectual property, but because what if
what they say then doesn’t agree with what someone else is saying.
You keep your cards close to your chest within your business area
and as long as your business area is happy, then there's no need to
publicise further.” (Safety Policy Manager/Defence)
3.5. Practical challenges
Participants identiﬁed a large number of practical challenges to
managing and justifying trade-oﬀs between risk reduction and cost.
These challenges are concerned with the complexity of systems, the
diﬃculty of performing a quantitative analysis, and the use of the
analysis results.
3.5.1. Complexity
The complexity and scale of industrial systems poses a challenge to
the risk analysis and the estimation of beneﬁts. Setting the boundary
for the analysis might be diﬃcult because the consequences of certain
events might propagate throughout the system in unforeseen or even
unpredictable ways.
Participants suggested it was important to involve all relevant
stakeholders. In large-scale systems with many diﬀerent roles and
even diﬀerent organisations involved, getting the right people together
for risk analysis, and accessing data from diﬀerent organisations can be
challenging. In addition, in such multi-stakeholder environments the
costs and the beneﬁts might not be evenly distributed between the
diﬀerent stakeholders, i.e. there might be “winners and losers”.
Reaching agreement in such situations might be practically challen-
ging.
3.5.2. Quantiﬁcation
Performing a quantitative CBA can be challenging because the
numbers that go into the analysis are based on estimates, and the error
associated with these estimates might scale up during the calculations
to the extent that there is little conﬁdence in the overall result. This
problem is exacerbated for novel systems, where the costs and the way
of use have not been properly established. CBA is often used for high
consequence accident scenarios (e.g. explosion on a petrochemical
processing facility, mid-air collision between two aircraft etc.), but the
likelihood of, and hence the conﬁdence in the estimates about such
events might be very low.
Quantiﬁcation of the safety beneﬁt might be challenging for a
number of reasons: due to the complexity of systems alluded to above,
it might be diﬃcult to identify the precise contribution to global system
safety of an intervention at the local level; and considerations such as
impact on consumer conﬁdence and business reputation might be hard
to foresee and express in monetary terms with conﬁdence.
3.5.3. Use
In order to understand and use the output of any analysis
appropriately, decision makers need to be provided with an apprecia-
tion of the range of factors that were considered or excluded, and the
uncertainty associated with the analysis. There is a risk that with the
use of CBA the focus shifts from a thorough understanding of the risks
towards the mechanics of the method. If the sensitivity of the analysis
is left unexplained the results might be deceiving to those who need to
base their decisions on them. In the extreme case, the application of
CBA might be perceived as generating an answer that is desirable by
adjusting assumptions and ﬁgures accordingly.
4. Lessons and priorities for health care – stakeholder
consensus development
The industry stakeholder perceptions described in the previous
section served as input for the consensus development process with
health care stakeholders (as described in Section 2).
4.1. Consensus on how the trade-oﬀ between risk reduction and cost
is currently managed
Nine validation statements about the current practice in health care
were presented to participant, see Table 5 (A. Validation of Workshop
Discussion). Participants reached consensus on eight of these.
Participants perceive the current approach to managing the trade-oﬀ
between risk reduction interventions and cost as not transparent. Risk
management is perceived as being reactive, and as lacking in under-
standing of systems and organisational issues. The concept of risk and
the measurement of risk are perceived as poorly understood in health
care. The role of the regulator is viewed critically, with regulators
perceived as not incentivising risk reduction. While the majority of
participants agreed that the regulator does not operate with a well-
deﬁned notion of what constitutes acceptable levels of risk, there was
no consensus reached on this aspect.
4.2. Lessons and priorities
The discussions around the scenarios and the plenary discussion of
the workshop were summarised in twelve consensus statements, see
Table 5 (B. Lessons and priorities). Participants reached consensus on
six of these (including one reversely worded consensus statement 9).
The consensus can be expressed in terms of ﬁve key recommendations
for health care.
4.2.1. Recommendation 1: There should be regulatory incentives for
organisations to reduce risk
There is a perceived lack of institutional driver for, and absence of
regulatory guidance on systematically reducing risk. While organisa-
tions and individuals are engaged in developing and implementing risk
reduction interventions, these are often not carried out systematically
and depend on individual initiative. Without institutional drivers and
regulatory guidance there might not be suﬃcient traction to promote
proactive consideration of patient safety risk. The recommendation is,
therefore, that regulatory incentives should be established for organi-
sations to reduce risk.
Currently, there are already incentives to reduce harm (based on
outcome measures, e.g. number of pressure ulcers) and to comply with
best practice (based on process measures, e.g. timely administration of
antibiotics to reduce the likelihood of severe sepsis). These might be
extended to include incentives for reducing risk. Ideally, the systematic
reduction of risk would be promoted throughout regulatory and quality
assurance bodies.
There is a need for inspectors and guidance developers to have a
thorough understanding of patient safety risk and proactive risk
management approaches. This might require targeted education that
enables, for example, inspectors to ask the right questions, and
assessors to look for adequate arguments and corresponding evidence.
In addition, a suitable communication tool to facilitate the interaction
between regulators and healthcare organisations around risk is re-
quired.
4.2.2. Recommendation 2: A regulatory framework should be
established, which provides best practice guidance on standardised
risk reduction interventions
There is a perceived lack of guidance on how to develop, implement
and demonstrate the impact of standardised risk reduction interven-
tions. While there are many mandatory practices (e.g. mandatory risk
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assessments and screenings for patients at risk of falls, infections etc.),
there is a perceived emphasis on meeting regulatory targets rather than
on reducing risk. The recommendation is that regulators provide more
practical guidance on speciﬁc risk reduction interventions and on how
to demonstrate that risk has been reduced.
Regulatory bodies aim to be drivers for improvement, and they
deﬁne quality standards and specify targets as indicators of quality of
care. These might be accompanied further by guidance on how to
implement risk reduction interventions that fulﬁl these quality aims. In
addition, further guidance is required on how to demonstrate, in a
consistent way, that the implementation of the recommended inter-
ventions have contributed to a reduction in risk.
4.2.3. Recommendation 3: Organisations should develop an explicit
account of patient safety risks in the form of a safety case (even if not
mandated) in order to complement the ﬁnance focus of their business
cases
The focus of quality and safety improvement in many healthcare
organisations is provided by the investigation into serious adverse
events, the occurrence of never events, and by external targets (such as
reduction in the number of patient falls). Such learning and drivers are
based on observed outcomes, i.e. they are reactive, and they do not
provide a proactive, systems-based focus on the risks that are present
in the care processes. The recommendation is that organisations should
adopt an appropriately tailored safety case concept to develop an
explicit account of patient safety risks.
4.2.4. Recommendation 4: Health systems should adopt a health care
speciﬁc notion of acceptable levels of risk
When organisations start to develop an understanding of the risks
present in the system, they are confronted with a large number of
potential threats to patient safety. At present, healthcare organisations
do not possess systematic processes or criteria that enable them to
determine in a consistent and transparent way whether risks should be
reduced further and how the trade-oﬀ between cost and risk reduction
should be managed. As a result, the way risks are approached varies
signiﬁcantly and relies often on individual judgement. The recommen-
dation is that the NHS as a whole should reason about possible
common notions of acceptable levels of risk, or frameworks for
determining these, that can be used in the decision-making process.
The NHS faces diﬀerent challenges than other safety-critical
industries, and there is a duty to provide care to an aging population
with increasingly complex health needs while at the same time
reducing the burden on the taxpayer. It might be argued that a strict
principle, such as ALARP, cannot be implemented within the ﬁnancial
climate of the NHS. However, it should be possible to start a dialogue
and build a common framework around how the NHS as a whole would
like to treat patient safety risk and corresponding trade-oﬀs between
cost and risk reduction in a consistent way.
A main prerequisite for starting such a process is a better under-
standing of risk in the NHS. Further education is required to provide a
more proactive mindset that shifts from the consideration of outcomes
only towards a risk-based perspective. One way to get this started is by
developing explicit accounts of the risks that are present in the system.
4.2.5. Recommendation 5: Health systems should adopt a structured
process for managing trade-oﬀs between risk reduction and cost
Care processes and pathways can be complex, and the eﬀects of
changes and risk reduction interventions might be diﬃcult to anticipate
to their full extent, in particular when services are provided across
organisational boundaries. However, the extent to which risks are
assessed proactively, and the criteria that are used to manage potential
trade-oﬀs between risk reduction and cost depend largely on individual
initiative and judgement. The recommendation is for the NHS as a
whole (and for other health systems) to consider the development of a
structured framework for managing such trade-oﬀs to ensure consis-
tency and transparency across the NHS.
The learning from other industries provides evidence of the utility
of a structured approach to managing trade-oﬀs between risk reduction
and cost. In particular in situations that are complex and where the
assessment of risk and the estimation of costs and beneﬁts are diﬃcult,
the use of a structured process might be very valuable to facilitate
justiﬁcation and assessment of decisions taken.
This will require a dialogue among the diﬀerent stakeholders in the
NHS. Learning from other industries about the use of ALARP and
safety cases could provide helpful insights, but it is likely that the
health sector needs to come up with solutions that are tailored
speciﬁcally to the needs of healthcare. Greater awareness of the notion
of risk in patient safety and the current level of risk in care processes
might represent a useful and necessary ﬁrst step.
5. Discussion
The results of this study suggest that health care stakeholders
perceive a need for better understanding and for greater transparency
of how decisions about risk reduction and the associated costs are
made. While there are diﬀerences between safety-critical industries and
health care, study participants identiﬁed lessons for health care based
on the learning from other industries. These lessons are addressed to
health care organisations, the regulators, and health systems as a
whole. Study participants recommended that the concept of risk should
be integrated better into safety management and regulatory practices
as a prerequisite for making and justifying decisions about risk
reduction and cost. Health care organisations should identify and
document their current levels of risk in a safety case, suitably tailored
for use in health care. A regulatory framework that incentivises risk
reduction and provides best practice guidance should be established.
Study participants also recommended that health systems should
engage in discussions about what constitutes acceptable levels of risk,
and what an appropriate process and framework for making decisions
about risk reduction and cost should look like.
Study participants from the health sector suggested that the
concepts of risk (in relation to patient safety) and of risk management
are poorly understood. This is hardly surprising, considering also the
ongoing debate about the nature of risk in the scientiﬁc literature
[15,16,41]. While detailed discussion of issues such as uncertainty
[18], emerging risk [42], and Black Swans [43,44] is beyond the scope
of this paper, there are practical considerations in the literature, which
have a direct relevance for the results reported in this study. The health
care stakeholders recommended that health systems develop a health-
care speciﬁc notion of acceptable levels of risk. The UK industry
stakeholders perceived the ALARP concept as a reasonable framework
for making and justifying decisions about risk reduction interventions
and the associated costs. However, the analysis of the interviews
demonstrated that making judgements about risk reduction in practice
does not appear to rely on the ALARP concept in a simplistic and
deterministic way. Decisions about risk reduction and about whether a
system is regarded as safe enough are inﬂuenced by broader con-
siderations of corporate responsibility, ethical reasoning, other poten-
tial business beneﬁts and impacts, and, at times, whether it was “a good
thing” to do. In the literature similar views have been expressed. It has
been pointed out that relying on the ALARP concept in isolation might
create considerable practical, philosophical and ethical problems
[11,12,45,46]. In addition, it has been suggested that risk analysis
and managerial decisions about risk should be regarded as two distinct
phases [24]. Decisions about risk reduction could be considered risk-
informed rather than risk-based [15], because they are based on not
only the scientiﬁc evidence produced during the risk analysis, but also
on social discourse and other value judgements [11,22,43]. ALARP has
also been criticised for not addressing how the views of the public
might be integrated [11]. These practical considerations appear
particularly relevant in a health care context, where patients are at
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the centre of the service, and where risk perceptions can be shaped
signiﬁcantly by personal experience and social interactions [23].
A second practical problem identiﬁed by interview participants as
well as the literature pertains to the use of quantitative CBA to inform
decisions about risk reduction. Industry participants suggested that
quantiﬁcation of costs and beneﬁts was challenging due to the
complexity of many systems, which can lead to oversimpliﬁcation
and a focus on those aspects that can be quantiﬁed more readily.
Participants also suggested that application of CBA was challenging
due to the uncertainty associated with high severity, low probability
events, which can have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the validity of CBA
calculations. Similarly, in the literature the use of expected values in
CBA has been criticised when used as the basis for safety management
[47–49]. This use of expected values does not take into account that
diﬀerent scenarios with the same expected value might be perceived
diﬀerently by society. The term societal risk has been coined to refer to
events with multiple fatalities. It has been suggested that for such high-
consequence events risk aversion among the public might be greater,
and this is not considered when using CBA based on expected values
[47–49]. The recent interest in the concept of Black Swan events [50]
within the risk and safety communities also highlights the problem of
using probabilistic modelling for such high severity, low probability
events [43,44]. It has been suggested that risk management approaches
should, therefore, be explicit about the uncertainty associated with
assumptions made, and that they should be appropriately adaptive to
include not only risk-based strategies but also precautionary strategies
and sensitivity to weak signals [42,47–49]. Of particular interest in a
health care context is the complexity of systems. ALARP decisions have
been criticised for focusing too much on the local context, while failing
to consider the wider impact on the system [51]. National health
systems typically have a duty of care to the whole population while the
budget is determined and ﬁxed by a government department. Well-
intentioned risk reduction in one area might preclude investment in the
development and provision of services in another area, thus creating a
further trade-oﬀ to consider in the decision-making process.
Current safety management practices in health care are often not
informed by a detailed risk analysis. Practice is largely reactive, and is
frequently driven by the investigation of serious untoward incidents
and by the counting of past harms [52,53]. Safety improvement eﬀorts
are then directed at preventing similar incidents from occurring again,
and at reducing certain harms to meet regulatory targets. However, one
might question whether the use of such pre-deﬁned criteria and targets
provides a good enough driver for continuous improvement [54]. It has
been frequently suggested that health care organisations are lacking the
capacity to learn and to improve sustainably and transparently [52,55–
58]. Lessons from industry, as well as from the present study, suggest
that organisations should aim to understand their risks proactively,
and then generate improvement alternatives and weigh the associated
burdens and beneﬁts in a systematic manner [48,54,59]. A key
recommendation for industry following from the Nimrod Review was
that organisations should document and make explicit their current
risk position, rather than to argue that a system is safe [13]. This
proposed shift from safety cases to risk cases might also be a good
starting point for health care organisations for incorporating a risk-
based approach into their safety management practices [7]. This view is
supported by the recommendations generated by the health care
stakeholders reported in this paper. There has been criticism of the
safety case concept for regulatory purposes [46,60], but as a practical
improvement tool for documenting that risks have been understood a
suitably tailored safe case approach might provide health care organi-
sations with structure and direction for embedding the risk concept in
their safety management practice [8,61].
Regulatory bodies can play an important role in facilitating the
adoption of consistent and transparent risk management approaches
across an industry [7]. This is particularly important as there is an
increasing recognition that many patient safety problems would
require sector-wide collaboration and coordination [62]. In the NHS,
as well as in other health systems, there are many safety targets, e.g. so-
called Never Events [63], and performance indicators for a range of
well established harms (for example the NHS Safety Thermometer
[64]). There are also instances, where regulatory standards set out
requirements based on a risk analysis framework, for example for
medical devices [65] or for selected high-risk processes [66]. However,
there is no consistent approach across the health system for learning
from past experience and for continuously improving practice [52,55],
which would be a prerequisite for a transparent framework for
reasoning about trade-oﬀs between risk reductions and cost.
Incentivising risk reduction, as suggested by the stakeholders in this
study, might be a potential consideration for regulatory bodies in order
to provide a greater drive for improvement. A potentially limiting factor
might be the fact that there is no single body to provide centralised and
coordinated oversight of patient safety [67]. It has been suggested that
the presence of, currently, more than 20 regulatory bodies in health
and social care in England has led to a lack of a coherent push towards
improving patient safety [68]. Initiatives in the UK and the US
suggested that the framework for regulating patient safety should be
reconsidered [68], and recommended the introduction of a national
patient safety oversight structure [67]. At least in the NHS it is hard to
see this happening in the short to medium term, even more so with the
abolishment of the National Patient Safety Agency in 2012. It is also
worth noting that there would be a need for knowledge, eﬀort and
resource within any such regulatory body in order to make such an
approach work eﬀectively in practice [54,69].
Resolution of the above challenges is beyond the scope of this
paper, and, as one reviewer of the manuscript pointed out, the devil will
be in the detail. It is worth noting that health systems are very
heterogeneous entities. Diﬀerent parts of the health care system or
diﬀerent health care processes might require diﬀerent risk manage-
ment approaches, which might emphasise, for example, risk avoidance
for well-understood processes and more adaptive strategies for novel
and less tractable processes [42,70,71]. Highlighting the need for a
dialogue among stakeholders about how health systems should treat
patient safety risks in a consistent and transparent way, informed by
experiences from other industries, might be a promising starting point.
5.1. Limitations
The study design used a qualitative research approach, which relies on
views and opinions elicited from study participants. The participants
typically will have had an interest in the study topic and in research more
generally. Therefore, there is a risk of bias because study participants’ views
might not be representative of other people working in their domain. This is
particularly true for the participants from the health care sector, who could
be regarded as patient safety enthusiasts in their respective organisations.
Participants from health care all had a strong interest in patient
safety, and for some managing risk and improving patient safety was
their main job focus. However, one might assume that only a minority
of the participants had any detailed prior knowledge of industrial risk
management practices or the ALARP concept. Therefore, participants
were confronted with new information during the consensus develop-
ment process. The potential lack of in-depth understanding of these
issues might lead to oversimpliﬁcation in the formulation of recom-
mendations. This source of bias should be acceptable, because parti-
cipants’ recommendations are intended as a starting point for debate
rather than as concrete suggestions for immediate implementation.
It has been highlighted that health care is not like an industrial
product that is manufactured, but rather a service that is co-created
between the patient and the various health care professionals [72].
Including the views of the patient and the public is an important
consideration in health services research. The consensus development
process did not include patient and public representatives, and this
should be considered a priority in further discussion and debate.
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6. Conclusions
Learning from other industries suggests that it is possible to
construct a facilitating regulatory framework, for example based on
the concept of “reasonable practicability”, in order to support consis-
tency and transparency in making and justifying trade-oﬀs about risk
reductions and the associated cost across industries. In practice, such a
framework is not just about safety risks and costs, but can also include
consideration of corporate responsibility, and ethical and societal
concerns.
In health care, trade-oﬀs about risk reductions and cost are often
not managed consistently or transparently. Local teams might be
enthusiastic about improving patient safety, but the lack of a shared
framework might lead to varied practice and some frustration. Study
participants from health care provided ﬁve recommendations aimed at
health care organisations, regulatory bodies and health systems as a
whole, in order to better manage trade-oﬀs, as well as patient safety
risks more generally. These recommendations need to be underpinned
by education and greater awareness around the concept of risk and
proactive risk management in health care. Progress could be made
reasonably quickly in some instances, for example through the adop-
tion of safety cases as a practical improvement tool to reason about
risks in a structured way, and through the introduction of regulatory
incentives for risk reduction.
Learning from other industries can provide valuable insights, but
the health sector will have to develop frameworks that work in health.
This might be particularly true when considering acceptable levels of
risk and the ALARP framework. ALARP might or might not be
applicable in health care, but the need for a shared framework for
making and justifying risk reduction decisions has been clearly
identiﬁed in this study. Stakeholders should engage in discussions,
and develop a consensus about how health systems can manage risks to
patient safety and the necessary trade-oﬀs in a consistent and
transparent way.
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